The Egregious Violation Exception In Immigration Proceedings: How To Resolve The Circuit Split With A Totality Of Circumstances Approach by Mistry, Hetal M.
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
5-1-2014
The Egregious Violation Exception In Immigration
Proceedings: How To Resolve The Circuit Split
With A Totality Of Circumstances Approach
Hetal M. Mistry
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Mistry, Hetal M., "The Egregious Violation Exception In Immigration Proceedings: How To Resolve The Circuit Split With A Totality
Of Circumstances Approach" (2014). Law School Student Scholarship. 535.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/535
THE EGREGIOUS VIOLATION EXCEPTION IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS: HOW TO RESOLVE THE 
CIRCUIT SPLIT WITH A TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH 
Hetal Mistry 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 26, 2007, several armed and uniformed ICE officers arrived at a two-story 
New Jersey apartment building at 4:30 a.m.
1
  They rang the entrance buzzer to the apartment 
incessantly.
2
  One of the residents, Clara, opened the door to the building fearing there was an 
emergency.
3
  She saw five or six ICE officers coming up the stairs.
4
  As they approached the 
door, they showed her an administrative warrant they had for her sister, Maria.
5
  The officers 
asked Clara to verify her immigration status to which she stated she was a legal permanent 
resident (“LPR”).6  Then they asked to enter the apartment at which time Clara allowed them to 
enter, even though Maria was not there.
7
  At the time, Clara was unaware of the fact that she 
could refuse to let them enter and was under the impression that the warrant gave the officers the 
right to enter the apartment even if Maria had not been there.
8
  Several other people, along with 
Clara’s brother, Erick Oliva-Ramos, lived in this apartment.9  Once in the apartment, the officer 
ordered everyone to the living room.
10
  One of the ICE officers stood by the entrance to the 
apartment, so that no one could leave.
11
  At no point did the officers identify who they were, 
much less show a badge, or indicate why they were there to the rest of the residents.
12
  The only 
                                                          
1
 Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney General of the U.S., 694 F.3d 259, 261 (3d Cir. 2012). 
2
 Id. at 261-262. 
3
 Id. at 262.  
4
 Id.  
5
 Id.  
6
 Id.  
7
 Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 262. 
8
 Id.  
9
 Id.  
10
 Id.  
11
 Id. 
12
 Id. 
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indication the residents had that these were immigration officers were the green ICE uniforms 
that the officers were wearing.
13
  The officers asked everyone about Maria and her legal status 
and then began to question them about their nationalities and identities.
14
  They did not allow the 
residents to stand or leave the door closed when using the bathroom.
15
  One officer ordered 
Oliva-Ramos to get his identification documents, which indicated that he was a Guatemalan 
citizen, and not lawfully present in the United States.
16
  When he followed orders and retrieved 
his documents, an officer arrested Oliva-Ramos.
17
  Although Oliva-Ramos argued that the 
identification documents should be suppressed as a fruit of an illegal search pursuant to the 
exclusionary rule, the judge allowed them and ordered him deported from the United States.
18
   
Over the past three decades, there has been controversy among the Federal Circuit Courts 
on whether the exclusionary rule is applicable in immigration proceedings.  While the 
exclusionary rule in clearly applicable in criminal proceedings, courts have long held that 
immigration is not punishment and therefore the same constitutional protections are not 
guaranteed in immigration proceedings.
19
  Courts have also divided over what conduct violates 
the Fourth Amendment in the context of immigration proceedings.
20
  
In 1984, the Supreme Court in INS v. Lopez Mendoza
21
 first addressed the issue of 
whether the exclusionary rule was applicable to a civil deportation hearing.
22
  In Lopez Mendoza, 
                                                          
13
 Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 262. 
14
 Id. 
15
 Id. at 263. 
16
 Id. at 262. 
17
 Id.  
18
 Id at 264. 
19
 See, e.g.,  Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593 (1952)(“Deportation is a not a punishment but a refusal 
by the government not keep noncitizens whose presence is hurtful in the country.”.); Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, (1893) (The court discusses that deportation proceedings are not punishments for a crime 
committed but rather whether they have complied with the conditions to remain in the country); Carlson v. Landon, 
342 U.S. 524, 537(1952)(“Deportation is not a criminal proceeding and has never been held to be punishment.”). 
20
 See Elizabeth A. Rossi, Revisiting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza: Why the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Should 
Apply in Deportation Proceedings, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477 (2013). 
21
 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
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after an unlawful arrest, the petitioner made an admission to his unlawful presence in the United 
States.
23
  The court held that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply in deportation 
proceedings, making illegally obtained evidence admissible against the noncitizen.
24
  At arriving 
at this conclusion, the court, however, left a narrow opening that would allow the exclusionary 
rule to apply in two situations in immigration proceedings.
25
  The first exception where the 
exclusionary rule would apply is when INS officers committed widespread violations of the 
Fourth Amendment.
26
  The court would also allow the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in 
situations of “egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress 
notion of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”27    
After the decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, lower federal courts did not know how to 
apply the two exclusionary rule exceptions in removal proceedings.  As a result, the United 
States Court of Appeals has split regarding the meaning of “egregious” within the exception for 
egregious Fourth Amendment violations.
28
  Currently, the Circuit Courts are divided between a 
conduct-based approach and a bad-faith approach.  The conduct-based approach does not only 
focus on the ICE officer and the severity of the alleged violation, but also focuses on the 
probative value of the evidence.
29
  On the other hand, the bad faith approach is a broader view 
that requires the noncitizen only to prove either that the actions by the ICE officers were 
deliberate or that they should have known was in violation of the Fourth Amendment, focusing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
22
 Id. at 1034. 
23
 Id.  
24
 Id. at 1050. 
25
 Id. at 1035. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050.  
28
 See supra note 26.  
29
 Christine L. Vigliotti, Gonzalez-Rivera v. Ins: An Unwarranted Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Civil 
Deportation Hearings, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1133, 1169 (1995). 
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primarily on the violation.
30
  Without a uniform test between all circuits, noncitizens will be 
more susceptible to removability in certain areas of the country.
31
  The Third Circuit, in Oliva-
Ramos v. Attorney General of the United States, developed a workable and practical standard 
that incorporated certain conduct developed from other circuits in one variation of the conduct-
based approach that if adopted by all courts will resolve this evidentiary issue.
32
  
This comment will argue that the conduct-based totality of circumstances standard, used 
in Oliva-Ramos,
33
 is the correct standard that will help courts interpret when the egregious 
violation exception applies in removal proceedings.  Part II will provide background of the 
exclusionary rule and its application to removal hearings.
34
  Part III will discuss the various 
approaches that the circuits have used, including the totality of circumstances conduct based test 
employed Oliva-Ramos.  Part IV will analyze why the Third Circuit approach is the correct 
approach.  Lastly, part V will conclude that in order for courts to apply a uniform standard to the 
egregious violation exception, they should apply the standard set forth in Oliva-Ramos. 
 
II. BACKGROUND: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS APPLICATION TO REMOVAL HEARINGS 
A.  The Exclusionary Rule  
  The exclusionary rule is a judicially created evidentiary doctrine derived from the 
Fourth Amendment
35
 that requires that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in 
                                                          
30
 Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994). 
31
 See Generally Irene Scharf, The Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Proceedings: Where it was, Where it is, Where 
it May Be Going, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 53, 69 (2010). 
32
 Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney General of the U.S., 694 F.3d 259, 259 (3d Cir. 2012). 
33
  Id. 
34
 See Part II. 
35
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”).  
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violation of the Constitution . . . [be] inadmissible in court.”36  This rule applies to all subsequent 
evidence or “fruits” that are obtained or derive from the original illegal conduct by law 
enforcement.
37
  In order for the evidence to be deemed admissible during a search or seizure, the 
conduct by law enforcement must be justified by probable cause.
38
  An officer has probable 
cause when the known facts and circumstances would warrant a reasonable person to believe that 
there is evidence of wrongdoing.
39
 
The primary purpose of this rule is to deter unlawful conduct by the police and 
“effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”40  It is, however, not a personal constitutional right for the victim whose privacy has 
been breached.
41
  In order to challenge the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, a 
defendant must have suffered from a constitutional violation.
42
  This challenge is usually a 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence and if defendant is successful, then the illegally obtained 
evidence will be inadmissible at trial.
43
  This will further ensure that the defendant is given a fair 
trial under their due process rights.
44
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
37
 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 475 (1963). 
38
 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). 
39
 Id.  
40
 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). 
41
 Id.  
42
 Matthew S. Mulqueen, Rethinking the Role of the Exclusionary Rule in Removal Proceedings, 82 St. JOHNS’S L. 
REV. 1157, 1162 (2008). 
43
 Id.  
44
 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
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B. Immigration Proceedings in Contrast to Criminal Proceedings  
Unlike the criminal proceedings, the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the 
power to regulate immigration.
45
  Rather, through the plenary power doctrine, immigration is 
regulated by the legislative and executive branches with the judicial branch having a very limited 
role.
46
  Even though it gives Congress the authorization to control the naturalization process, 
immigration law has developed through the various statutes and regulations created by both the 
legislative and executive branches.
47
  The plenary power doctrine provides great judicial 
deference when it comes to Congressional regulation of immigration.
48
 Unfortunately, for 
noncitizens, because of this power, they are not afforded the same protections of the Constitution 
as an American citizen.
49
  Noncitizens are still, however, afforded limited due process rights.
50
  
They have the “privilege” of having counsel; however, the government will not provide one for 
them in case they cannot afford one.
51
  They do however, have the right to “examine all the 
                                                          
45
 Denise M. Fabiano, Immigration Law--Flores v. Meese: A Lost Opportunity to Reconsider the Plenary Power 
Doctrine in Immigration Decisions, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 257, 258 (1992). 
46
 Id.  
47
 Jon Feere, Plenary Power: Should Judges Control U.S. Immigration Policy?, (February 2009), 
http://www.cis.org/plenarypower.  
48
 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)(noting that decisions made by the legislature to 
exclude noncitizens are conclusive upon the judiciary); See also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 
(1892)(also affirming that the executive branch’s immigration decision is final and the judiciary was not second 
guess their decision); Matthews v. Diaz et al. 426 U.S. 67 (1976)( emphasizing that the Legislature or Executive are 
“of a character more appropriate” to address the issues of immigration). 
49
See Kleindienst v. Mandel et al., 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (Court upheld the exclusion of revolutionary Marxist 
because this was a characteristic that Congress has forbidden using the plenary power limiting the noncitizen’s first 
amendment rights); Matthews, 426 U.S. at  67 (Noncitizens had to be admitted in this country for 5 years before 
they can receive Medicare.);  See generally Jon Feere, Plenary Power: Should Judges Control U.S. Immigration 
Policy?, (February 2009), http://www.cis.org/plenarypower. 
50
 See Yamataya v. Fisher 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (The respondent must be given notice of deportation and the 
opportunity to be heard in order to satisfy due process in deportation hearings.) See generally United States ex rel. 
Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927) (stating that deportation without a fair hearing is a 
denial of due process); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920) (reversing a decision upholding the exclusion 
of a United States citizen of Chinese descent due to the failure of the examining inspector to include testimony of 
three witnesses favorable to the petitioner in the record of proceedings). 
51
 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(4)(A)(2000)(This is unlike criminal proceedings where the defendant has the right to an 
attorney and if they cannot afford one, one will be appointed to them.). 
6 
 
evidence against [them], present evidence on [their] own behalf, and cross examine witnesses 
presented by the Government.”52  
Immigration deportation proceedings are different from the criminal justice system. 
Unlike criminal proceedings, deportation proceedings are purely civil in nature.
53
  These 
proceedings are meant, “to determine the noncitizen’s eligibility to remain in this country, not to 
punish an unlawful entry.”54  The noncitizens’ unlawful entry is only necessary to look at to see 
if it affects his right to remain in this country.
55
  The purpose of these proceedings is to “put an 
end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws.”56 
 The immigration judge’s only power is to order deportation.57  Because this is a civil 
proceeding, various safeguards that are given in the criminal context are not applicable in this 
proceeding.
58
  For one, although the noncitizen “must be given a reasonable opportunity to be 
present at the proceeding,” if they fail to appear, the proceeding may continue with or without 
their presence.
59
  In a criminal proceedings on the other hand, a failure to appear will not 
continue their proceeding unless a waiver of appearance has been executed.
60
  The burden of 
proof also significantly varies between both proceedings.
61
  In deportation proceedings, the 
                                                          
52
 Id.  
53
 INS v. Lopez Mendoza 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1974). But see Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New 
Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent 
Residents? 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2011) (“Deportation involves both civil and criminal elements, making it 
appear quasi-criminal.”); Patricia J. Schofield, Evidence in Deportation Proceedings, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1537, 1568 
(1985)(“Deportation hearings should be recognized as the quasi-criminal proceedings that they in fact are.”).  
54
 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1306, 1325. 
55
 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1252(b). 
56
 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039. 
57
 Id.  
58
 Id.  
59
 8 U.S.C. §1252(b). 
60
  See generally Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L.J. 1435, 
1458 (2009). 
61
 Matthew S. Mulqueen, Rethinking the Role of the Exclusionary Rule in Removal Proceedings, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1157, 1164-1166 (2008). 
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government has the burden to show only identity and alienage.
62
  Then, the burden shifts to the 
noncitizen to prove their lawful entry.
63
  In the criminal context the government is required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt; however, in the immigration context the Board of Immigration 
Appeals only requires clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.
64
  The immigration judge’s 
decision to deport the noncitizen “needs only to be based on reasonable, substantial and 
probative evidence” offered by the Government at the hearing.65  The evidence of the alienage 
and deportability of the noncitizen is usually gathered at the time of the arrest in a Form I-213, 
Record of Deportable Noncitizen.
66
   
If at the time of arrest the evidence was obtained through an illegal search and seizure, it 
is crucial to the noncitizen that this evidence be excluded from the hearing.
67
  Since immigration 
proceedings require a lower burden of proof for the Government, these documents would more 
likely have the noncitizen deported than if they were not admitted into evidence.
68
  As a result, 
these people would be torn from their homes, separated from their families, and snatched away 
from their employment.
69
   
 
C. ICE’s Home Raid Operations 
 As a response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) was created under the newly established Department of 
Homeland Security.
70
  These terrorist attacks further increased the need to tighten security 
                                                          
62
 8 U.S.C. § 1361. 
63
 Id.  
64
 INS v. Lopez Mendoza 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1974). 
65
 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4). 
66
 See Martinez-Camargo v. INS, 282 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2002). 
67
 Mulqeen, supra at 1165.  
68
 Id.  
69
 Id. at 1177. 
70
 Who Joined DHS, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs; Id. at 1174-1176. 
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measures on immigration, as the hijackers were all immigrants.
71
  ICE was designed to enforce 
the immigration law, which includes the detention, removal, intelligence and investigation.
72
  
The department’s main focus in enforcement is on high priority targets, as such the department 
engages in home raid operations.
73
  
These raids, however, must be conducted pursuant to the constitutional requirements in 
the Fourth Amendment.
74
  Under the Fourth Amendment, people have the right to be protected 
“in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”75  
Additionally, warrants are only to be issued “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be 
seized.”76  In order to justify many searches and seizures, a warrant must be issued in advance 
from a neutral and detached magistrate.
77
  Unlike arrests in public, searches or arrest in the 
home, do require a warrant, unless the officer has fit into one of the exceptions.
78
  Among those 
exceptions, include the property owner’s valid consent to search.79 
Notwithstanding these Constitutional mandates, immigrants allege that the ICE raids are 
being conducted in such a way as to violate their constitutional rights.
80
  The number of raids by 
ICE officers has “grown dramatically” in the recent years and with it arose much controversy.81   
                                                          
71
 Identity and Immigration Status of 9/11 Terrorists (2011), FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, 
available at http://www.fairus.org/issue/identity-and-immigration-status-of-9-11-terrorists. 
72
 Id.  
73
 Bess Chiu et al., CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, Constitution on ICE: A Report on Immigration 
Home Raid Operations 3 (2009) [hereinafter Cardozo Immigration Justice Clinic], available at http:// 
www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/immigrationlaw-741/IJC_ICE-Home-Raid-
Report%20Updated.pdf.) at 6. 
74
 Id. 
75
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
76
 Id.  
77
 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1977). 
78
 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). 
79
 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). 
80
 Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in 
Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507 (2011). 
81
  Id. at 511.  
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The widespread pattern of behavior included warrantless search of the premises, lack of consent 
from residents before entry, and forceful entry.
82
  Consequently, courts have seen an increase in 
pretrial suppression motions and have been trying to interpret the Supreme Court decision of 
I.N.S. v. Lopez - Mendoza
83
 to see if the exclusionary rule would apply in removal proceedings.
84
  
 
D. INS v. Lopez Mendoza  
Until 1984, there was very little case law for the immigration judges to determine the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule to immigration proceedings.  Then the Supreme Court of 
the United States granted certiorari in INS v. Lopez Mendoza to determine “whether an admission 
of unlawful presence in this country made subsequent to an allegedly unlawful arrest must be 
excluded as evidence in a civil deportation hearing.”85  In this case, the Supreme Court 
consolidated two cases where the respondents were arrested at their place of employment when 
the INS investigators impermissibly questioned the respondents.
86
  The court held that the 
evidence obtained from the INS officers was admissible in civil deportation hearing.
87
  The court 
did not conclude that the exclusionary rule does not apply to all removal hearings, but that it 
would be inapplicable in most situations.
88
  The court did, however, suggest that the exclusionary 
rule would apply narrowly and in two particular situations.
89
  The first situation, in immigration 
proceedings, where the exclusionary rule would apply is called the widespread violation test.
90
 
This requires there to be a “good reason to believe that the Fourth Amendment violations by INS 
                                                          
82
 Id; See supra note 73. 
83
 INS v. Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
84
 Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in 
Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507, 527 (2011). 
85
 Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051. 
86
 Id. at 1035-1037. 
87
 Id. at 1051. 
88
 Id. at 1050-1051. 
89
 Id. at 1050. 
90
 Id. at 1050. 
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officers were widespread.”91  The second situation is the egregious violations test, which requires 
that the “egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress 
notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”92  
 The court did a cost benefit analysis of excluding reliable evidence from a deportation 
proceeding to arrive at the holding.
93
  The benefit of allowing the evidence to be excluded if 
obtained in violation of the constitution would be to deter future unlawful police conduct.
94
  The 
Court noted, however, that there is a low deterrence value in the application of the exclusionary 
rule in deportation proceedings.
95
  In addition, the Court noted that there are “unusual and 
significant” societal costs.96  The Court’s main concern was that immigration judges are not well 
versed in the Fourth Amendment, and applying the exclusionary rule would cause unnecessary 
delays and “inordinate amount of time spent on such cases at all level [will cause] an adverse 
impact on the effective administration of immigration laws.”97  The court noted that the INS 
already has taken “sensible and reasonable steps” towards deterring INS officers from violating 
the Fourth Amendment.
98
  Thus, in weighing the costs and benefits, the court held that the 
balance weighs against applying the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings.
99
  
 In this case, four Justices wrote strong dissents arguing for general applicability of the 
exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings.  Justice White wrote the strongest dissent 
articulating that the exclusionary rule should apply in deportation proceedings and that the 
                                                          
91
 Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050. 
92
 Id. at 1050-1051. 
93
 Id. at 1042. 
94
 Id. at 1043-1044. 
95
 Id. at 1046. 
96
 Id. at 1046. 
97
 Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1048-1049. 
98
 Id. at 1050. 
99
 Id. at 1050. 
11 
 
majority had an “incorrect assessment of the cost and benefits.”100  In his dissenting opinion he 
stated how the cost and benefits in the deportation setting do not differ “in any significant way” 
from the criminal setting.
101
  As for the deterrent value, Justice White explained that the INS 
agents and police officers essentially have the same mission to use the evidence in the 
proceedings and that the “civil deportation proceedings are to INS agents what criminal trials are 
to police officers.”102  Justice White concluded that the exclusionary rule should apply but only 
when “evidence has been obtained by deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment or by 
conduct a reasonably competent officer would know is contrary to the Constitution.”103  Justice 
Brennan agreed with Justice White and found that the basis of and importance of the 
exclusionary rule is derived from the Fourth Amendment itself, not because it had a deterrence 
value.
104
  Further Justice Marshall also agreed that the exclusionary rule should apply to at least 
some extent in deportation proceedings because “there is no other way to achieve the twin goals 
of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of the partnership in official lawlessness and of 
assuring the people-all potential victims of unlawful government conduct- that the government 
would not profit from its lawless behavior.”105  Lastly, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice 
White’s dissent.106  These four justices agreed that the exclusionary rule should apply in 
deportation proceedings at least to some extent.  
 
III. THE EGREGIOUS VIOLATIONS EXCEPTION CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
                                                          
100
 Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1052. (White, J., dissenting). 
101
 Id. at 1060. (White, J., dissenting).  
102
 Id. at 1054. (White, J., dissenting).  
103
 Id. at 1060. (White J., dissenting). 
104
 Id. at 1052. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Government of the United States bears an obligation to obey the 
Fourth Amendment; that obligation is not lifted simply because the law enforcement officers were agents of the 
immigration and Naturalization Service, nor because the evidence obtained by those officers was to be used in civil 
deportation hearings.”).  
105
 Id. at 1060-1061 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
106
 Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1061. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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 Due to INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the immigration judge can only apply the exclusionary 
rule in two situations.  The “egregious” violations exception involves conduct by INS officers 
that is in violation of the Fourth Amendment that would weaken the value of the evidence 
obtained and “transgress notions of fundamental fairness.”107  The courts have split on exactly 
what situations would be considered “egregious” and have essentially left two types of positions.  
The first approach is developed by the First and Second Circuits which apply a conduct-based 
analysis that focuses on the conduct of the INS agents and whether it was egregious or not.
108
  
This approach uses a list of factors to determine if the INS agent’s conduct rises to a level of 
egregious.
109
  The second approach is led by the Ninth Circuit, which uses a bad faith approach 
that analyzes whether the officer’s actions were reasonable or not.110  
 
A. Majority: Conduct Based Approach 
 The conduct based approached is supported by the First, Second, Eighth and Eleventh 
Circuits.  This approach focuses mainly on the conduct of the officers and uses certain factors to 
determine if the officer’s actions in arresting the noncitizen rises to level an “egregious”.  
 The First Circuit addressed this issue in Kandamar v. Gonzales.
111
  Here, the noncitizen 
overstayed his visa and was issued an National Security Entry-Exit Registration System 
(“NSEERS”) notice, which was a notice of registration only given to certain young males from 
designated countries indicating that they had to appear and interview before the Department of 
                                                          
107
 Id. at 1050-1051.  
108
 Kate Mahoney, What to do when the constable blunders? Egregious Violations of the Fourth Amendment in 
Removal Proceedings, IMMIGRATION LAW ADVISOR, (Sept. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILA-
Newsleter/ILA%202012/vol6no8.pdf. 
109
 Id.  
110
 Id.  
111
 464 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2006). 
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Homeland Security.
112
  At this interview, the Department of Homeland Security officer 
concluded that the noncitizen be put into removal proceedings for overstaying his visa and there 
he was ultimately determined removable.
113
  At the removal hearing, Kandamar made a motion 
to suppress the evidence obtained in the DHS interview because it was a denial of his due 
process and equal protection rights, but the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied this motion.114  In 
this case, he challenged the denial of the motion to suppress and the First Circuit Court affirmed 
the denial.
115
  Here, the Court first determined there is an egregious violation when the 
government uses “threats, coercion, or physical abuse”116  The court concluded that this 
interview did not rise to that level because it neither asked Kandamar to leave, told him to leave 
or restrain him from leaving in any way.
117
  Therefore, there was no denial of Kandamar’s due 
process or equal protection rights.
118
  Kandamar next argued to suppress his passport because it 
constituted as a seizure and was fundamentally unfair.
119
  The court held that because he suffered 
no prejudice from the seizure of the passport, that it did justify the reversal of the removal 
order.
120
  Further, the court addressed Lopez Mendoza stating, “evidence will be excluded if the 
circumstances surrounding a particular arrest and interrogation would render use of the evidence 
obtained thereby fundamentally unfair and in violation of due process requirements of the Fifth 
Amendment.”121  Thus, the court determined the type of conduct that would constitute an 
egregious violation, which set a relatively high standard for the noncitizen to meet.  
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 The most notable case that adopted this approach arose from the Second Circuit. In 
Almedia-Amaral v. Gonzales,
122
 the noncitizen was a minor who was found by a border patrol 
agent just as he was crossing into the United States through Texas.
123
  He was subsequently 
asked to stop and provide identification.
124
  The noncitizen provided the agent with a Brazilian 
passport and was then arrested and taken into custody for not having a U.S. Passport.
125
  While in 
custody, he gave a statement that he later sought to suppress arguing that since he was an 
unaccompanied minor his statement was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
126
  The motion 
to suppress was denied by the IJ and BIA.
127
  Here, the court found that the conduct of the agent 
was not so egregious to warrant suppression of the evidence.
128
  According to the Second Circuit, 
to warrant an exclusion of evidence in a deportation proceeding, the record of evidence must 
establish either (1) an egregious violation occurred, which was fundamentally unfair, or (2) 
regardless of the egregiousness, the violation “undermined the reliability of the evidence in 
dispute.”129  The court offered two situations in which the egregious violation hat occurred was 
fundamentally unfair.
130
  The first situation is based on the validity of the stop and the 
“characteristics and severity of the offending conduct.”131  The court explained that if the officer 
were to stop the noncitizen for no reason at all and if the seizure was not severe, then it would 
not constitute an egregious violation.
132
  The second situation that the Second Circuit addressed 
that would be egregious would be if it were based on “race or some other grossly improper 
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consideration”, even though the seizure itself was not severe.133  Although the court pointed out 
these two situations, it was in no way intended to be an exhaustive list of circumstances.
134
  
Additionally, the court further explained that the seizure itself would be severe or unreasonable 
“when the initial stop is particularly lengthy [or] there is show or use of force.”135  This circuit 
has given other courts guidance on how to interpret the small opening left by Lopez Mendoza 
with a workable test. 
 The Eighth Circuit also adopted a conduct-based approach.  In 2010, in Puc-Ruiz v. 
Holder,
136
 the noncitizen was arrested in a restaurant where he worked when the local police 
entered the premises without a warrant.
137
  The police justified their warrantless entry with a 
suspicion that a local ordinance was being violated.
138
  When officers asked for identification, 
the noncitizen provided a valid license.
139
  After being taken to the police station for violation of 
the ordinance, ICE officials were contacted and two interviews were conducted that revealed the 
noncitizen to be removable for being an undocumented foreign national.
140
  Puc-Ruiz argued that 
the evidence obtained from his arrest at the restaurant should be suppressed because the police 
arrested him without probable cause and therefore the use of any evidence obtained would be 
fundamentally unfair.
141
  The court did not agree with Puc-Ruiz and held that “arresting 
noncitizen without probable cause was not sufficiently egregious to require suppression of 
evidence obtained as result of that arrest.”142  Here, the court noted that for the conduct to be 
considered egregious, there needs to be more than just a violation, but the conduct does not need 
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to be limited to just physical brutality.
143
  In arriving at this conclusion, the court used the 
standard derived from the Second Circuit determining the police officers did not use an 
unreasonable show or use of force nor did Puc-Ruiz claim that the arrest was based on race.
144
  
Further, the court mentioned that in this case there was at least some articulable suspicion to 
justify the warrantless entry because the information about the ordinance violation was a given 
tip.
145
  
 The Eleventh Circuit is the final circuit to employ the conduct based approached. In 
Ghysels-Reals v. U. S. AG,
146
 an noncitizen was detained after a routine traffic stop.
147
  The 
noncitizen argued that the stop was unlawful and as a result, the evidence obtained from the stop 
should be suppressed.
148
  Here, the court concluded that the traffic stop did not rise to a level of 
egregious that would warrant a suppression of the evidence.
149
  The court explained that the 
noncitizen was not subjected to any “abuse, force, racial profiling or other conduct that rises to 
the level required for exclusion.”150  The court used some of the factors that the Second Circuit 
developed in its interpretation.  Similarly, it also left open the possibility that there is other 
conduct that would be egregious and the court did not want to limit that possibility.  
 
B. Minority: Bad Faith Approach 
 
 The Ninth Circuit developed the bad faith approach, which places a lower burden on the 
noncitizen to prove egregious conduct on the part of the officer in comparison to the conduct-
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based approach.  This standard was first created in Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS.
151
  Gonzalez was 
arrested after failing to show proper documentation at a traffic stop.
152
  Gonzalez alleged that he 
was stopped “solely on the basis of his Hispanic appearance” and wanted to suppress the 
evidence obtained in the illegal stop.
153
  The court concluded that this was a race-based stop, 
which was egregious and warranted a suppression of the evidence.
154
  In arriving at this 
conclusion, the court articulated an objective bad faith standard. 
155
  Under this standard, a 
violation occurs when “evidence is obtained by deliberate violation of the fourth amendment or 
by conduct a reasonable officer should have known is in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”156  
The court further elaborated on the conduct the police officer should have known in Martinez-
Mendoza v. Holder.
157
  Here, the court determined that the bad faith standard also includes an 
analysis to see if the agents are “acting against an unequivocal doctrinal backdrop.”158  The court 
explained here, that a search would violate a noncitizen’s Fourth Amendment right because the 
government cannot show proper entry into the noncitizen’s premises from defendant’s silence or 
objection to entry.
159
  Therefore, an egregious violation would still occur because the officer’s, 
even if they did not know, they should have known that entering into the noncitizen’s home 
without a warrant, consent or exigent circumstances would violate the noncitizen’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.
160
  Hence, the bad faith standard developed by the Ninth Circuit involves bad 
faith conduct by the police officer that the officer either deliberately committed or should have 
known it was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.   
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Further, this test has been seen by both supporters of the test as well as critics as an 
objective standard that relies on what the reasonable officer would have done in the same 
situation rather than the officer’s subjective intent.161  This would make the test an easier 
standard for the noncitizen to satisfy because they only have to prove a violation on the part of 
the officer, instead of what the actual officer was thinking at the time of the violation.  Unlike the 
conduct-based test, the minimal threshold is much lower.  In the conduct- based test, in addition 
to proving that the violation occurred, the noncitizen also has to show one of the aggravating 
factors set forth by that Circuit.  The Ninth Circuit is the only court that has adopted this standard 
and ironically has also granted more suppression motions than the circuits that have adopted the 
conduct based approach.
162
  It is questionable whether there is a correlation between this specific 
approach and successful suppression motions than, but it is worth noting. 
Other courts have criticized this approach. The Eighth Circuit in Garcia-Torres v. 
Holder,
163
 in a footnote, declined to adopt the bad faith standard.  The Court reasoned that it 
would “eviscerate Lopez-Mendoza insofar as the Fourth Amendment prohibits only 
unreasonable searches and seizures and the Ninth Circuit’s standard applies whenever a 
reasonable officer should have known his conduct was illegal.”164  Essentially, this standard 
would completely disregard the rule set forth in Lopez Mendoza.
165
  Although this approach 
would have a lower of burden of proof for the noncitizen, that burden is too low.  With the need 
for increased security measures after the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks, a reasonable standard 
needs to be set, which will balance both the security risks as well the noncitizen’s constitutional 
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rights.
166
  The Third Circuit also criticized this rule and explained that this standard would create 
“routine invasions of the constitutionally protected privacy rights of the individual.”167  Not only 
have other circuit courts criticized this approach, but also the Circuit Court Judges within the 
circuit have deemed this standard as “qualified immunity from civil liability for constitutional 
violations by Government officials.”168   
 
C. Remaining Circuits and lack of standards   
 
 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have addressed the issue of the interpretation of the 
egregious violation, but without specifically developing a standard.  The Seventh Circuit merely 
addressed one specific circumstance and set of facts that it deemed not be egregious.
169
  In this 
particular situation, there was an alleged warrantless arrest during which agents aggressively 
handcuffed and yelled at the noncitizen telling him “sign the f***ing papers claiming he did not 
have any rights.”170  Here, the court concluded that very minor physical abuse along with 
“aggressive questioning” employed by the agents against the noncitizen would not rise to a level 
of egregious conduct that would violate the Fourth Amendment.
171
  The court explained that 
verbal commands to instruct a person to sign papers would not be a search or seizure to trigger 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
172
  The court, additionally noted that handcuffing an 
uncooperative and resisting noncitizen also does not constitute as egregious behavior that the 
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Lopez-Mendoza Court anticipated.
173
  Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of 
egregious behavior is something higher than mere handcuffing or aggressive verbal 
commands.
174
  Besides, this one case, the Seventh Circuit has provided no other guidance on 
how to analyze conduct that would egregious.  
 Lastly, the Fifth Circuit has attempted to define a clear standard, but has yet to develop a 
workable standard.  In Gonzalez-Reyes v. Holder,
175
 the court determined that “the test for 
admissibility of evidence in a removal proceeding is whether the evidence is probative and 
whether its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the noncitizen of due process of law.”176  
Here, the noncitizen alleged that he was deprived of due process because he did not know of his 
right to remain silent or his right to retain counsel.
177
  The court held that a Miranda warning 
denial is not egregious because they are not required in the immigration and more specifically 
the deportation context.
178
  The Fifth Circuit also addressed this issue more recently in Torres-
Hernandez v. Holder.
179
  Here, the noncitizen moved to suppress in the information contained in 
Form I-213 on account of coercion and duress.
180
  The Court denied the motion noting that there 
was no coercion by the officers that would be considered to be egregious.
181
  The main focus of 
the court, however, was on the accuracy of the evidence obtained by the officers rather than the 
conduct employed to receive the information.
182
  This approach by the Fifth Circuit, relating to 
the accuracy of the evidence in relation to an egregious violation, is not one that has been 
addressed by other courts, nor has it been addressed by the Fifth Circuit again  
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D. Correct Approach: Totality of Circumstances Conduct Based Approach  
 
Oliva Ramos v. Attorney General of the United States was a case of first impression in 
the Third Circuit addressing the issue of whether the exclusionary rule applied in removal 
proceedings.
183
  As mentioned in the beginning of this comment, ICE officers forced their way 
into the New Jersey apartment and demanded identification papers from Olivia-Ramos.
184
 
 Oliva-Ramos argued that the evidence should be suppressed because “the ICE agents 
failed to obtain proper consent to enter the apartment.”185  Additionally, Oliva-Ramos argued 
that they arrested him without a warrant and probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.
186
  The 
court ultimately allowed Oliva-Ramos to reopen his proceedings.
187
  The Third Circuit, however, 
acknowledged that it had not yet considered what situations would constitute an egregious 
violation.
188
  The court analyzed the Ninth Circuit’s bad faith approach, but concluded that 
would be a difficult standard to work with.
189
  The court reasoned that “focusing only on [the 
officer’s] good faith would permit conduct that may be objectively reasonable based on 
directives of the Department of Homeland Security, but nevertheless result in routine invasions 
of the constitutionally protected privacy rights of the individuals.”190  
After rejecting the Ninth Circuit approach, the court adopted the conduct-based test 
developed by the Second Circuit with a slight modification.
191
  In order for the evidence to be a 
“result of the egregious violation within the meaning of Lopez Mendoza, . . . the record evidence 
[must establish] either (a) that a constitutional violation that was fundamentally unfair had 
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occurred, or (b) that the violation – regardless of its unfairness – undermined the reliability of the 
evidence in dispute.”192  When applying this test, the court explained that whether or not there 
was probative value to the evidence, it should not be part of the inquiry.
193
  Based on this 
exception, the court remanded the case back to the BIA to determine “whether the ICE agents 
violated Oliva-Ramos’s Fourth Amendment rights and whether those violations were 
egregious.”194  Additionally the court also stated that when addressing this standard, it must be a 
“flexible case by case approach” that is based around several factors.195  However, unlike most 
other courts, this court listed several factors that the BIA should consider when arriving at its 
conclusion.
196
  These factors include: (1) whether the noncitizen can establish intentional 
violations of the Fourth Amendment by the officers, (2)”whether the seizure itself was so gross 
or unreasonable in addition to being without a plausible legal ground,” (3) “whether improper 
seizures, illegal entry of homes or arrests incurred threats, coercion or physical abuse,” (4) “the 
extent to which the agents repot the unreasonable show of force,” and (5) whether any seizure or 
arrests were based on race of perceived ethnicity.”197  Furthermore, consistent with the other 
circuits following the conduct-based approach, the Third Circuit suggested that “the 
characteristics and severity of the police conduct” should be relevant to the inquiry.198  
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IV. OLIVA-RAMOS IS THE CORRECT APPROACH TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
    
The standard that the Third Circuit developed is the correct approach that should be 
adopted by all the circuits.  It will bring uniformity among all the circuits because this approach 
ties together the ideas of the circuits behind the conduct-based approach and it is the most 
practical approach in relation to public policy. 
 
A. Uniform approach incorporating the Other Circuits 
 
 This approach taken by the Third Circuit has incorporated the ideas from several other 
circuits that also follow the conduct-based approach.  First, the Third Circuit adopted the Second 
Circuit test with a slight modification: the Second Circuit required “a violation” whereas in Third 
Circuit required a “constitutional violation” to be fundamentally unfair.199  Therefore, the Second 
and Third Circuits both agreed that the probative value of evidence is not required.
200
  The Third 
Circuit also used the characteristics and severity of the conduct situation as one of the factors that 
could be egregious.
201
  Next, the Third Circuit Court addressed some of the factors listed in the 
First Circuit, which include “threats, coercion, or physical abuse.”202  The Court also included 
factors from the Eighth Circuit, which include “physical brutality and unreasonable show or use 
of force.”203  The Third Circuit took all these factors and made it into one inquiry of factors that 
should be considered, but again emphasized as with the other court, that it is not a list of 
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exhaustive factors.
204
  As a result, the Third Circuit Court created a totality of circumstances test 
for the conduct-based approach.
205
  
 Additionally, by incorporating all the circuits’ different factors into one inquiry, the court 
also noted that this would make it more of an individualized test, which would be based on a 
case-by-case approach.
206
 Essentially this will allow the respondent to feel as if the system is 
individualized to them and giving them a fair hearing instead of a predetermined judgment.  
 Further, by incorporating all the factors from other circuits, the Third Circuit decision is 
“instructive” for practicing attorneys.207  In a practice advisory issued shortly after this case, it 
stated that the opinion would be “useful to practitioners litigating the exception for the first 
time.”208  Therefore, not only will this case bring uniformity to all the judges hearing this case, 
but it will also allow practicing attorneys a guideline on how to approach their own cases and 
clients and provide for effective client representation.
209
  Without this uniformity, clients may 
feel it necessary to move to a different jurisdiction that could increase their likelihood of success 
in immigration proceedings.
210
  As a practical matter for both judges and attorneys, this approach 
provides the most guidance on how to determine if an egregious violation occurred.  
Even though it has been argued that this standard is “likely to breed unpredictability and 
may lead to arbitrary results”, it provides a combination of factors for the courts as well as 
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practicing attorneys to consider.
211
  Since this is a case-by-case approach, these factors will help 
to predict what types of behaviors by officers will be considered violations on the egregious 
spectrum. Although this approach is not perfect, it provides the most realistic approach to 
determining what an egregious violation is.  
 
B. Practical under Public Policy 
In allowing the exclusionary rule to apply in deportation proceedings, many 
undocumented non-citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights will be protected.212  This decision will 
allow for the noncitizens to “seek redress for constitutional grievances.”213  Among the 
population in the United States, immigrants are the most vulnerable and the ones that are taken 
advantage the most.
214
  The immigrant population is more likely to have less education than 
others and have less financial resources to even consider hiring counsel.
215
  Additionally, most 
immigrants also lack the knowledge of the U.S. legal system and their rights.
216
  
The Department of Homeland Security also has its own constitutional requirements that 
provide Fourth Amendment protections for a non-citizen noncitizen.
217
  These constitutional 
requirements apply to ICE’s conduct in home raids, which include seeking a judicial warrant 
before entering a home, rather than just an administrative warrant.
218
  However, the 
administrative warrant can be sufficient if there is informed consent by the occupant of the 
                                                          
211
 Elizabeth A. Rossi, Revisiting Ins v. Lopez-Mendoza: Why the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Should 
Apply in Deportation Proceedings, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477, 511 (2013). 
212
 Lauren Bowman, The Third Circuit Adopts the Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Proceedings, (February 26, 
2013), http://www.jlpp.org/2013/02/26/the-third-circuit-adopts-the-exclusionary-rule-in-immigration-removal-
proceedings. 
213
 Id.  
214
 Cardozo Immigration Justice Clinic at 25. 
215
 Id. 
216
 Id. 
217
 Id. at 5. (Some of the protections require a judicial warrant to enter home, warrantless arrests when there is 
probable cause, reasonable suspicion for seizure of the person, etc.) 
218
 Id. 
26 
 
residence.
219
  According the DHS manual, during a home raid if consent is given, the ICE agent 
may ask questions about the intended target, or other people they encounter in the home.
220
  An 
ICE agent, however, may not detain an occupant unless he or she has a “reasonable suspicion 
based on specific articulable facts, that the person being questioned is a noncitizen in the United 
States.”221  The data collected by this clinic shows that the ICE agents “failed to obtain lawful 
consent to enter homes in violation of the Constitution in a large percentage of cases.”222  This 
proves that the ICE agents need to be deterred.  If the exclusionary rule is not applicable, then the 
agents will continue to violate the constitution knowing that the unlawfully obtained evidence 
from the arrest will be applicable to the deportation proceeding. 
The Third Circuit decision is considered by many to be a victory because it will create 
awareness to the public of the unconstitutional policies employed by ICE.
223
  For example, in 
2008, ICE agents used a gun to threaten a nine-year old boy and his parents while his mother was 
showering.
224
  Their extreme policing procedures have also included a tremendous form of 
humiliation by forcing a resident to stand in his underwear before his brother, sister in law and 
children while the agents conducted a warrantless search of their home.
225
  As seen in Oliva-
Ramos,  the agents did not at first allow the Clara to use the bathroom or retrieve any feminine 
products when she began menstruating during the raid and when they finally allowed her to she 
was forced to the door open with an ICE agent standing right outside the door.
226
  These tactics 
used by ICE agents are not only violations of the noncitizen’s Fourth Amendment rights, but 
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they are violent, intrusive and humiliating.
227
  Further, most of these intrusions occurred before 
7:00 a.m. and involved a display of weapons.
228
  
In 2009, students in the Cardozo Immigration Justice Clinic at the Cardozo School of 
Law conducted a report on immigration home raid operations, which brought greater awareness 
to these extreme policing procedures employed by ICE agents.
229
  The report found that ICE 
agents have an established a pattern of widespread misconduct during home raids which include 
illegal entry of homes without legal authority, seizure of non-targeted individuals, illegal search 
of homes, and seizure based on race or ethnicity
230
 and limited English proficiency.
231
  In their 
study, the data collected showed that most arrests by ICE agents were for collateral arrests as 
opposed to the targeted arrests in which they sought initial entry.
232
  Further this report indicates 
that the number of suppression motions overall have increased since 2006 when ICE created new 
performance expectations and increased their home raid operations.
233
  This recent rise in 
suppression motions is an indicator of a pattern of illegality that ICE agents use in home raid 
operations.
234
  Although these numbers suggest that ICE agents are merely trying to meet a 
quota, there is much more at stake for the noncitizen they arresting.  Not only are their Fourth 
Amendment rights violated, but their risk of being separated from their families, losing their 
livelihood, and being sent back to a country with fewer opportunities is highly increased by these 
agent’s policing strategies.  The method employed by the Third Circuit will heighten the 
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awareness of the severity of the misconduct by taking into consideration every step that affected 
the immigrant.  
 Critics argue that without the exclusionary rule applicable to deportation proceedings, 
“many ICE violations will go unpunished”235 and will “undermine the traditional crime fighting 
mission of local law enforcement agencies.”236  Some believe that this decision will “go a long 
way in reigning in the extreme policing strategies” that ICE uses.237  In hindsight, the efforts of 
ICE to tighten the security in the realm of immigrant after the September 11
th
 attacks will be lost 
by the methods employed by the agents.  Even though now is the time that immigration 
enforcement should be stricter, it does not mean that it has to be at the hands of the immigrant.  
By analyzing the totality of circumstances, ICE officers will be more aware of their extreme 
policies and will now know the extent to which they can conduct these raids.  This will prove to 
be a deterrent for the ICE officers because they care about prosecutions and convictions.
238
  
Further, this will be likely to improve the agency’s and local law enforcement’s relationship with 
immigrant communities.
239
   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 After INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Court left a small opening to allow for the exclusionary 
rule to apply in very limited circumstances.  One of these circumstances included egregious 
violations and it is with that that the circuit courts have struggled to interpret today.  Fortunately, 
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the Third Circuit rendered an instructive decision in Oliva-Ramos that will resolve the circuit 
split.  The correct standard that should be used is the totality of circumstances conduct based 
approach with the following test: “the record evidence [must establish] either (a) that a 
constitutional violation that was fundamentally unfair had occurred, or (b) that the violation – 
regardless of its unfairness – undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.”240  This 
decision incorporates all the relevant factors the circuit courts used within the conduct-based 
approach.  Further, this decision has implicated practical considerations in spreading the 
awareness of the extreme ICE policing strategies and providing Fourth Amendment protection to 
undocumented non-citizens.  Lastly, the opposing bad faith approach is not a workable standard 
that any court should consider.  The federal circuits should have a uniform standard and adopt 
the test and reasoning of the Third Circuit.  This will allow for noncitizens in different circuits to 
be treated equally and not be advantaged because their circuit has adopted a lower standard to 
prove egregious conduct of the officer.  
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